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Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort 
Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, ]r.* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the issue of how to balance bailouts (or 
"lending into arrears") with debt reductions (or "private sector 
involvement") in the resolution of sovereign debt crises. It provides a 
review of recent proposals for improving the sovereign debt restructuring 
process. In addition to defending a sovereign bankruptcy proposal we have 
put forward in recent work, this article proposes a major reorientation of 
the IMF's role in sovereign debt crises. 
I. INTROD U CTION 
Since the Mexican Debt Crisis of 1994-95, which gave rise to an 
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") bailout of unprecedented size, there has 
been a raging debate on how the IMF should handle sovereign debt crises. 
Despite the successful resolution of the crisis and Mexico's quick repayment of 
all its emergency debt, the sheer size of the intervention has raised worries that 
bailouts could cause significant sovereign debt market distortions. These 
. concerns, in turn, have led to a reconsideration of the prevailing wisdom that the 
IMF can and should act as the de facto international lender of last resort 
("ILOLR") by arranging bailouts in response to major sovereign debt crises. As 
is now widely recognized, the problem with a purely bailout-based policy is that 
it requires ever larger funds to be credible and successful. It also invites 
undesirable policies by debtor countries. The prospect of a bailout encourages 
suvereign debtors to borrow more than they should, and it tempts them to 
resort to highly risky fixed exchange rate policies as a quick fix towards 
John H. Scully '66 Professor of Finance and Economics, Princeton University; S. Samuel Arsht 
Professor of Corporate Law, ·Universit),of Pennsylvania. We are grateful to Bill Bratton, Lee 
Buchheit, Douglas Diamond, Mitu Gulati, Jim Feinerman, Dan Tarullo, Kathy Zeiler and to 
participants at a workshop at Georgetown University Law Center and at the IPD-UN Sovereign 
Debt Initiative meetings at Columbia University for helpful comments on earlier drafts· 
1 77 
Chicago Jotlrnal oIIlItemational LaJ)J 
macroeconomic discipline. 1 Of course, the worst debtor misconduct can be 
controlled to some extent by imposing conditions on the debtor country before 
granting a rescue program, but more often than not, the IMF finds itself in a 
weak bargaining position at the onset of a debt crisis. How credible is the IMF 
threat to withhold a financial aid package when a potentially contagious debt 
crisis is about to erupt? And once the bailout has been granted, why should the 
debtor country abide by the conditions it agreed to? 
Because of the potentially enormous financial commitment a pure ILOLR 
policy requires, and because of the moral hazard it may induce in sovereign debt 
markets, it is now widely understood that bailouts need to be supplemented by 
at least a partial "bailin" of the private sector. According to this view, the IMP's 
involvement in a debt crisis should be conditioned on debt reduction or 
rescheduling by private sector lenders. Private creditors should be required" that 
is, to share at least some of the costs of resolving a crisis. Despite this emerging 
consensus on the importance of private sector involvement, however, there is 
still considerable disagreement on the appropriate balancing between bailout and 
bailin, and on the best process for crisis resolution and debt restructuring. 
The most ambitious overhaul of IMF policy contemplated so far involves 
the introduction of some form of bankruptcy institution for sovereigns and 
envisions a single forum where the extent of debt reduction and the size of new 
emergency lending would be decided simultaneously. There was considerable 
discussion and research of this strategy-which the IMF calls a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRlvI")-from late 2001, when the IMF first 
announced its support for a sovereign bankruptcy framework, up to the G-10 
meetings in April 2003, when the IMP's proposal was shelved. Despite all the 
writing and debates, many open questions were still unresolved at the time of the 
G-10 meetings, including the role of the IMF in an SDRM regime. No doubt 
these questions would have received further attention if the SDRlvI proposal had 
gone forward. But in the aftermath of the SDlUvI debate, no clear new role has 
been marked out for the IMF and no clear rules have emerged to direct the 
IMP's balancing of bailins and bailouts in future debt crises. 
As a result, the IMF now finds itself at a crossroads. Should it be content 
with the status quo and accept that it will be less and less equipped to deal with 
major emerging market debt crises? Or, on the contrary, should its size be 
The IMF bears its own share of responsibility in recommending such policies. For critical 
assessments of IMF policy recommendations on macroeconomic stabilization and intervention 
during the Asia crisis of 1997-98, see Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Disis that Rocked the 
Global Fillamial Systelll and Hllmbled the IAiF (publicAffairs 2001) and ] oseph E. Stiglitz, 
Globalizatioll alld Its Discontents, 89-132 (Norton 2002). For a more sympathetic view, see Nouriel 
Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailollts or Bail-illS?: Re.rpolldillg to Fillal/cial Clises ill EtllCIgilig Ecollomies (Inst 
Inti Econ 2004). 
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considerably expanded, possibly by granting a more powerful role to Japan, 
China and other East Asian countries that are sitting on massive idle foreign 
exchange reserves? Or, even more radically, should the Il'vlF disclaim any role in 
crisis lending and confine itself to an advisory and forecasting function, as Chari 
and Kehoe, Rogoff, and others have urged?2 
In this paper, we argue that by establishing an adequate bankruptcy 
procedure for sovereigns, the international community could both fully address 
the problem of sovereign debt restructuring and redefine an ambitious crisis 
resolution role for the IMP. Far from stepping away from a crisis lending role, 
we argue that the IMF could, without increasing the size of its funding, enhance 
its ILOLR role within the framework of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. How 
do we square this circle? 
Corporate bankruptcy provides a useful analogy for describing the new role 
we envision for the IMP. When a nonfinancial corporation ends up in financial 
distress, it does not, as a rule, seek a bailout from the government. Instead it ftles 
for bankruptcy, thus receiving temporary relief from its creditors. This relief 
from creditors-or "stay"-is the characteristic of corporate bankruptcy that 
has been emphasized most in the sovereign context. But, in addition to a stay on 
debt collection, and more significant for our purposes, the distressed firm can 
also ask the court to approve new priority lending-usually in connection with 
so-called "first day orders" that authorize the company to continue paying its 
employees and thus preserve its going concern value.3 When the bankruptcy 
court grants new priority lending, it is not extending its own funds, as the IMF 
2 In his pO"l.verful analysis of the history of \X/orld Bank and IMF lending over the past sixty years, 
Rogoff argues: 
[M]y long-held view is that the Fund would serve better if it made no loans. In 
a nutshell, the Fund's current resources of $150 billion seem like enough to 
cause moral-hazard problems (that is, to induce excessive borrowing) without 
being enough to deal with a really deep global financial crisis. The Fund is just 
too politicised to be a consistently effective lender of last resort, and if its 
financial structure is not changed, there are always going to be Argentinas. 
No, the right future for the Fund, as for the IBRD, is to phase itself out of the 
lending business. The Fund can still make itself very useful in co-ordinating 
the global financial system, in offering technical advice, and perhaps even in 
is.5uing debt ratings to countries that request it. If the global community can 
work its way towards an improved bankruptcy procedure for sovereign 
borrowers, this path will be far easier. I would recommend it regardless. 
Kenneth Rogoff, The Sisters at 60, Economist 63, 65 Ouly 24, 2004). See also V.v. Chari and 
Patrick J. Kehoe, Asking the Right Questions about the IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Annual Report Issue (1998) (arguing that there is no need for the IMF to serve as ILOLR given 
that the central banks of the G-7 can already intervene directly in the event of a crisis). 
First day orders are described in Marvin Krasny and Kevin J. Carey, Editors Rep!;' to an Anol1)!Jl/ous 
Leffelj' WI:')I is Delmllare the Venue of Choice for Philadelphia-Based Companies?, Legal Intelligencer 9 
(March 22, 1996); Marcus Cole, 'Ve/al/.'are is Not a State": Are We /Pitnessingjunsdictiona/ Competition 
in BallkmptC)I?, 55 Vand L Rev 1845, 1856 n 58, 1864-65 (2002). 
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does when it puts together a financing package for a distressed sovereign. All the 
court does is make way for new lending by the private sector-often the same 
lenders that have already lent to the distressed firm in the past-by granting the 
new loans higher priority status. 
We suggest that, just as a bankruptcy court does for corporations, the IMF 
could play the role of granting first-day orders to distressed sovereigns in the 
context of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. Importantly, the IMF would not 
need any new funding to exercise this authority. Thus, a major additional benefit 
of sovereign bankruptcy is that it could open the way for a new enhanced role 
for the IMP. This new role would indeed strengthen the IMF's hand, as it would 
enable the IMF to facilitate much larger emergency lending packages consisting 
not just of IMF funding but private lending as well. In addition, it would not 
give rise to the same concerns about moral hazard as does the current form of 
intervention that relies on publicly funded IMF bailouts. In particular, since the 
fund would no longer just be extending its own funds, it would be subject to 
greater market discipline. The private lenders that the IMF would invite to 
provide the new capital could be expected to do so only if there were a plausible 
financial rationale for extending the loans. Moreover, the IMF could not extend 
priority status too liberally without imperiling its very existence. 
To achieve this restructuring of the IMF's role, the underlying sovereign 
bankruptcy framework would need to provide coherent and enforceable priority 
rules.4 In earlier work that did not envision this new role for the IMF, we argued 
that solidifying creditors' seniority rights may be the single most important 
benefit of establishing a sovereign bankruptcy regime.s In this Article, we take 
the analysis a step further, to incorporate a reconceptualized role for the IMF-a 
role that would avoid the increasingly real risk that the IMF might otherwise 
become obsolete. 
The remainder of our article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we discuss the 
recent policy proposals for improving the sovereign debt restructuring process. 
We also consider the extent to which the benefits of a statutory procedure could 
be achieved through contractual alternatives, and briefly explore the implications 
At a minimum this new role for the IMF is possible only if higher priority status can be granted to 
emergency lending. So far, the IMF has been able to implicitly enforce higher priority on its own 
and other International Financial Institution ("IFI") loans. However, this de facto priority is partly 
an illusion as the IMF has generally agreed to roll over its loans when the sovereign was unable or 
unwilling to pay. This higher priority status has also recently been tested by Argentina following 
its default on sovereign bonds. Conceivably, the IMF could already play the new role ,"ve 
propose-granting higher priority to emergency loans from the private sector-under the current 
legal environment. However, de facto, implicit enforcement of priority is likely to be more 
difficult to scale up and may need to be shored up by legal enforcement through the courts. 
Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: HOJIJ Should a SO�'ereign Bankruptcy 
FrameJlJork Be .l/mettlred?, 53 Emory LJ 763, 766-67 (2004). 
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of the recent debt crisis in Argentina. Part III maps out the new role for the IMF 
and assesses how IMF actions in debt crises may need to be circumscribed. 
II. INTERVENTION 'IN DEBT CRISES AND POLICY DEBATES 
A wide range of reforms have been proposed as a partial or complete 
solution to the concerns described in the introduction. Such propositions have 
included greater use of collective action clauses ("CACs") in bonds, a structured 
mediation or arbitration process for addressing sovereign debt crises, and 
various forms of sovereign bankruptcy. This section first briefly discusses CACs 
and some problems with their use, and then focuses at greater length on the 
IMP's sovereign bankruptcy proposal, and on our own proposed framework-a 
more expansive alternative to the IMF proposa1.6 
Sovereign bonds governed by UK law have long included CACs specifying 
voting rules that permit a predetermined majority of bondholders to adjust 
payment or interest terms in the event of a debt crisis. In contrast, bonds 
governed by N ew York law have traditionally given each bondholder veto power 
to decide whether or not to agree to a restructuring. In the 1990s, an increasing 
number of commentators concluded that the New York "unarumit)," approach 
made restructuring too difficult. To facilitate coordination among the 
sovereign'S bondholders, and to counteract the threat of holdouts, they argued, 
sovereign debtors should include CACs in all of their bonds.7 
At its April 2003 meetings, the G-10, led by the US Treasury Department, 
endorsed a policy that strictly limits private sector involvement to only a 
voluntary inclusion of CACs in sovereign bond issues. Partly to stave off more 
drastic intervention in sovereign debt contracts and partly to placate the US 
Treasury, issuers have since introduced CACs into their new sovereign bond 
issues. In mid-2003, Mexico very publicly issued New York-registered bonds 
that permitted changes to the payment terms of bond with the consent of 75 
percent of the holders, and several other sovereigns, including Uruguay and 
Brazil, followed suit.8 
6 Id. 
7 For an early, influential emphasis on CACs, see Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, Cliszs? 
Wbat Crisis? OrderlY IWorkouts for Sovereign Debtors 49 (Centre for Econ Poly Rsrch 1995). More 
recentiy,NIiru{;uiati has written extensively about the use and promise of CACs. See, for 
example, Lee e. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and tbe Collective Will, 51 Emory L J 
1317 (2002). For a nuanced view of the choice between CACs and the unanimity approach, see 
William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt RejOI7Jl and tbe Best Interest oj Creditors, 57 
Vand L Rev 1 (2004). 
Since the end of 2003, nearly every new issuance of sovereign bonds has featured a CAe. 
Interestingly, the latest Uruguayan bond issues also include an aggregation clause that permits a 
combined vote of all the classes of bonds that include the clause. The clause is designed to 
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Despite these encouraging developments, however, there are still several 
reasons to suspect that CAC enthusiasts have oversold the virtues of the new 
clauses. First, CACs are more effective for restructuring one or a small number 
of classes of bonds, than for sovereign debtors with a more complicated capital 
structure.9 Second, although CACs help �ounteract collective action and holdout 
problems, they do nothing to remedy any seniority and debt dilution problems 
as we explain below. CACs also do not address concerns such as the need for a 
standstill while the sovereign debtor is renegotiatingjts obligations.lO Because of 
these shortcomings, we believe that a more interventionist policy, such as the 
statutory approach advocated by the IMF, is called for. 
A. THE IMF's SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCT U RING MECHANISM 
The IMF's sovereign bankruptcy initiative was first announced in a 
November 2001 speech by Anne Krueger. The IMF staff subsequently produced 
a series of detailed draft proposals outlining an SDRi\1 in 2002 and early 2003. 
Because the IMF's proposal has been the lightning rod for recent debate over 
sovereign bankruptcy, we will explore it in some detail before considering our 
d 1 
. 11 own propose a ternatlve. 
The guiding concern of the IMF's proposal is to resolve collective action 
problems among dispersed creditors in debt restructuring negotiations, while 
preserving creditor contractual rights to the greatest extent possible. Viewed 
from this perspective, the key element in the IMF's proposed mechanism is a 
majority vote among creditors on a restructuring plan that would bind a 
dissenting minority. With the aim of preserving creditor rights, the IMF's plan 
10 
11 
obviate the need for separate votes for each class of bonds by creating the possibility of a single, 
interclass vote on the terms of a restructuring. These developments are recounted and analyzed in 
Stephen J. Choi and G. lVlitu Gulati, Innol'atioll ill Boilerplate Contracts: All EllIpiJical E"'a!JlliJatioJl of 
Sot'ereigl  Bonds, 53 Emory L J 929 (2004) and Stephen Choi and G. Miru Gulati, Tbe Evoilitioll of 
BoileJplate COli tracts: Evidence from tbe Sovereign Debt lvIarket (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the authors). 
This point is discussed in more detail in David A. Skeel, J r., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do it 
All', 52 Emory LJ  417 (2003). 
Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 773-76 (discussing (his and additional shortcomings) (cited in 
note 5). 
Much of the description and analysis in this section is drawn from Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L 
J at 776-80 (cited in note 5). The IMP's first detailed proposal was Ii\lF, Tbe Design of the Sovereign 
Debt Restmcttlling j\1.echanisJJJ-Fllrtber Considerations (Nov 27, 2002), available online at 
<http://www.imf.org/external!np/pdr/sdrm/2002/1 12702.pdf>(visitedIvlarI5.2005). This 
proposal was subsequently adjusted. IMF, Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt RestJ'tlctllJiJ�g iVfecbanislll 
(Feb 12, 2003), available online at <http://,..vww.imf.org/e'Xternaljnp/pcl·r/sdrm/2003/ 
021203.pdf> (visited Mar 20, 2005). 
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stops short of envisaging a stay on litigation and individual debt collection 
efforts or a standstill on debt payments . The relative difficulty of collecting 
sovereign assets, as opposed to corporate assets, is the main justification given 
for not introducing an automatic stay into an SDRM. 
The main limitation on plaintiffs ' gains envisioned by the IMP mirrors a 
legal rule in international insolvency law known as the "Hotchpot rule." This 
rule requires that any payment or asset collected by a plaintiff through litigation 
must be offset against the plaintiff's claim under the restructuring agreement. 
That is,  any new claim the plaintiff would be entitled to under the res tructuring 
agreement would be reduced by an amount equal to what the creditor obtained 
through legal action. Should the plaintiff obtain more than what the 
restructuring agreement specifies,  the "Hotchpot rule" could be supplemented 
with a claw-back provision-but the IMP's propo sed plan excludes such a 
provision on the grounds that it would be impractical. 
The "Hotchpot rule" clearly reduces incentives for private litigation, but it 
does not eliminate them. Also, it does not directly address the concern that 
private litigation may be undertaken mainly as a negotiation or delaying tactic­
for example by undermining the sovereign's ability to trade. The IMP's proposed 
plan recognizes this is sue and proposes that a judge could have authority to stay 
specific legal actions on request of the debtor and subject to approval of 
creditors. 
The voting provision and the "Hotchpot rule" are the centerpieces of the 
IMP's proposed plan. The plan also contains many more technical provisions 
dealing with notification of creditors, registration, and verification of claims. As 
in corporate bankruptcy these can be lengthy and difficult processes. An 
important additional complication is that the ultimate ownership of a sovereign 
bond is hard to trace. The court must be able to pierce through the veil of 
beneficial ownership to be able to ascertain whether the votes on a particular 
bond are controlled by the sovereign. Should that be the case, these votes ought 
to be ineligible for obvious conflict of interest reasons.12 A related difficulty is 
that for widely dispersed debt structures many claims may not be registered in 
time. Given the large number of claims that will not qualify, a requirement that a 
supermaj ority of "'registered" claims approve the plan may function more like a 
simple majority requirement in practice-thus resulting in weaker protection of 
12 The problem of sovereign control of key claims, and through these claims, of a vote by creditors, 
figured prominently in a sovereign debt dispute involving Brazil in the 1990s. Through Banco do 
Brasil, which had participated in a syndicated loan agreement, Brazil managed to thwart an effort 
by other debtholders to accelerate the amounts due under the loan. CIBC Bank and Trust Campa/I)I 
v Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F Supp 1 105, 1118 (SDNY 1995) (refusing to intervene to impose 
implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing). For discussion and criticism, see Bratton and 
Gulati, 57 Vand L Rev at 75-77 (cited in note 7). 
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creditors. These difficulties underscore the need for a court-supervised 
restructuring procedure as well as the important benefits that might be available 
if an international clearinghouse were established. 
Because the principal concern of the IMF's proposed plan is resolving o f  
collective action problems among sovereign bondholders, the mechanism is 
underinclusive and incomplete as to the two other maj or facets of a restructuring 
procedure: the provision of interim financing and enforcement of absolute 
priority. The plan'S only means of enforcing absolute priority is through the 
exclusion of several classes of debt from the SDRM. Thus, the plan proposes to 
exclude privileged claims, obligations to international organizations such as the 
IMF ("multilaterals"), and debt owed to other nations (the "Paris Club"). The 
IMF proposal also gives the sovereign debtor discretion to exclude other debt 
claims-such as trade credit, claims on the central bank, etc.-from the SDR1VI:. 
An obvious difficulty with this approach is that it gives the debtor considerable 
power to undermine a given priority structure and to cut side deals with 
particular creditor clas ses in exchange for an exclusion of the claims from the 
formal SDRM proceedings . 
The plan recognizes some of these difficulties and offers, as an alternative, 
to include Paris Club debt in the SDR1\1 under a separate class .  The plan also 
allows for other forms o f  classification and gives the debtor discretion to classify 
subject to the general requirement that classification does not result in 
unjustified discrimination among creditor groups. 13 While classification brings 
about greater flexibility it is important to understand that it does not in any way 
guarantee enforcement of absolute priority. To the contrary, as currently 
structured the IMF's plan may well facilitate deviations from absolute priority by 
giving a veto power, unconstrained by a cram down or best interest rule, to a 
junior creditor class. 
Just as the IMF's plan does not systematically address the is sue of 
enforcing absolute priority it also only gives lip service to the issue of debtor-in­
posse ssion ("DIP") financing. With the objective once again of pres erving 
creditor contractual rights as much as possible, the IMF's proposed plan only 
allows for "priority financing" if it is approved by "75 percent of outstanding 
principal of registered claims." 14 The main purpose of DIP financing is to 
address an immediate cash crisis and allow the debtor to function while 
restructuring negotiations are ongoing. Clearly, a creditor vote would be 
extremely difficult to organize in a timely fashion, making it virtually impos sible 
to organize any such financing. 
13 
14 
IMF, Tbe Design of tbe SOIJereigll Debt Restructuring Alecbal1lsm-Fliltber ConsideratiollS at � 25 (cited in 
note 11). 
Id at � 23. 
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The last key component of the IMF's plan is its proposal to set up an 
independent Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum ("SDDRF") to oversee 
the sovereign bankruptcy process.1S The selection of SDDRF judges would be 
delegated to a selection panel designated by the IMF's Managing Director and 
charged with the task of creating a shortlist of candidate judges that might be 
impaneled when a debt crisis arises. The final shortlist would be subject to 
approval of the IMF's governing board. The president of the SDDRF would be 
charged with selection of the final group of four judges to be impaneled in the 
event of a crisis. While the plan goes to considerable lengths to guarantee the 
independence of the SDDRF it is still worth noting that this procedure is not a 
foolproof method to guarantee the full independence of the court. 
Overall, the IMF plan is an extremely important development in our 
thinking about how best to address sovereign debt crises. As this brief overview 
makes clear, however, it also has serious limitations. Most importantly, the IMF 
plan focuses extensively on the ex post issue of solving creditors' collective 
action problems, but it pays much less attention to the equally important issue of 
the ex ante effects of an SDRM-in particular, the need to honor creditors' 
priorities in order to facilitate sovereign credit markets. In addition, the IMF's 
interim financing proposal is cumbersome and does not fully address the 
growing concerns about the nature of the IMF's funding and oversight role. 
Finally, the creation of an SDDRF within the IMF itself raises independence and 
conflict of interest concerns. 
B. ENFORCING SENIORITY 
Although the IMF plan focuses on collective action problems, an equally 
important problem is debt dilution and the lack of enforcement of seniority in 
sovereign debt. In the absence of enforceable priorities, when a debtor country 
approaches financial distress any new debt it issues is partly at the expense of 
existing creditors who face a greater risk of default and will have to accept a 
greater "haircut" (or debt reduction) in the event of default, since the total 
resources the debtor can muster towards repayment of its stock of debt will have 
to be divided pro rata among all its creditors, old and new. In earlier work, we 
have highlighted how the lack of enforcement of an absolute priority rule 
encourages overborrowing by the sovereign as it approaches financial distress 
and also raises its overall cost of borrowing.16 
15 
16 
Id at � 227-73. 
Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 771-72 (cited in note 5). For a more extensive analysis, see 
Patrick Bolton and Olivier J eanne, Stmcttm·ng and Restnlctming Sovereigll Debt: The Role of SeniO/it)', 
available online at <http://gsb,vww.uchicago.edu/researcb/worksbops/finance/ 
Bolton_J eanne_October04.pdf> (visited Feb 9, 2005) (providing a formal analysis of optimal debt 
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Under the old IMF bailout-based policy the enforcement of an absolute 
priority rule was not a burning is sue, since typically private creditors could 
expect repayment in full. But the shift in IMF policy towards private sector 
involvement following the Russian debt crisis of 1998 has brought to light the 
issue o f  priority in repayment and introduced new uncertainty in sovereign debt 
markets by upsetting market expectations concerning seniority. Two subsequent 
events roiled the waters still further: (1) the deb t restructuring of Pakistan in 
1999-2000; and (2) the decision by the Court of Appeals of Brussels in 2000 to 
grant Elliott Associates, a vulture fund that had invested in Peruvian debt, a 
restraining order against Euroclear-preventing it from accepting transfers from 
the Peruvian government towards paying other creditors before Elliott's debt 
claims on Peru had been honored.17 
The first event, Pakistan's debt restructuring agreement o f  2000, required 
for the first time that Eurobond holders be included in the restructuring 
agreement, thus shattering the market's perception that these debts had higher 
priority status.18 The second event, Elliott Associates v Peru, alerted the market to 
the potentially far-reaching possibilities that the traditional interpretation of the 
standard pan' passu clause in sovereign bond issues might no longer be valid,19 
and that private litigants could threaten to disrupt the transfer of funds from 
sovereigns to creditors by obtaining restraining orders in court. 
The new uncertainty as to which types of sovereign debt will be subj ect to 
restructuring, and as to the meaning of the ubiquitous pczri passu clause, has 
propelled the issue of priority and debt seniority to the forefront of discussions 
about sovereign finance. Before examining how debt seniority can best be 
enforced, we begin by describing the Elliott decision and the legal debate 
surrounding it in more detail. 
Elliott Associates, playing an aggressive holdout strategy, refused to go 
along with Peru's proposed Brady Plan debt restructuring of 1995. Instead, it 
attempted to obtain repayment on its debt by initiating a series o f  lawsuits and 
eventually prevailed in the Court of Appeals of Brussels in September 2000. 
I" 
IH 
19 
structure in the absence of any legal enforcement of seniority). The authors show that creditors 
attempt to achieve higher priority de facto by making their debt difficult to restructure. Overall, 
this results in an excessively high cost of financial distress. Id. 
E/liott ASJocs, LP v Banco de la Nacion, 194 F3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir 1999); Elliot l\SSOCS, LP, 
General Docket No 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept 26,2000). 
See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Case jor all Explicit SenifJ/ity 5tmctnre iN Sonreign Debt (Sept 29; 2003) 
(unpublished working paper draft, IMF Research Department) (on ftle \vith authors) and Anna 
Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Cbart jor SOl'fl"eigli Res/me/mings, 53 Emory L J 1115, 1128-30 
(2004). 
The competing interpretations of the pati paJS/" clause are described below. See note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
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Eager to avoid a default on its Brady bonds, the Peruvian Government decided 
to settle follo"\ving the court's decision by paying Elliott in full.20 
Underlying the Brussels court's decisjon was a seemingly straightforward 
interpretation of the paripasstl clause. The clause states that "[t]he obligations of 
the Guarantor hereunder [the Peruvian Government] do rank and will rank at 
least pari passu in priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the 
Guarantor, and interest thereon." 21 The court interpreted this language as 
meaning that when the debtor is unable to repay all its debts in full, all claims of 
equal ranking under the pa17"passu clause should get a pro rata share of the total 
amount the debtor pays out. Most importantly, the court deemed that the debtor 
could not make payments to some creditors (the creditors who agreed to the 
restructuring) and default on others (the creditors who held out and retained 
their original bonds). It was on the basis of this interpretation that the court 
granted Elliott Associates a restraining order against Euroclear, the entity to 
which Peru had wired funds to pay consenting bondholders the scaled down 
amounts they had agreed to accept.22 
The court's interpretation provoked a torrent of criticism. 23 Most 
commentators favor an alternative reading of the pari passu clause: that it is 
designed to prevent the borrower from issuing new debt that is senior to existing 
debt. Which interpretation the courts will adopt in the future is still uncertain, 
although in light of the outpouring of academic writing and briefs following the 
Brussels Opinion, the narrower interpretation favored by most legal scholars 
seems likely to prevail. 
Lost in the hand-wringing over the Brussels Court of Appeals' novel 
interpretation of the boilerplate pa17"passu clause is the possibility that the court's 
remedy could open up a new strategy for enforcement of sovereign debt 
payments-with far-reaching consequences not conceived of before. Crucial to 
this possibility is the fact that the court granted a restraining order against 
EUROCLEAR, rather than limiting itself to a judgment against Peru. 
To appreciate the implications, start with Gulati and I<lee's ominous 
warning that: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
G. Mitu Gulati and Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Pirary, 56 Bus Law 635, 635-36 (2001). 
Id at 636. See also Elliott Assocs, LP v Ballco de la Nacion, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 14169 (SD NY Sept 
29,2000) and Elliott Assocs, U) v Republic ojPeru, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 368 (SDNY Jan 18,2000). 
In effect, Elliott claimed that it was entitled both to claim its share of the payments being made to 
consenting bondholders, and (unlike the consenters) to continue to insist on payment of the full 
face amount of its bonds. See Gulati and Klee, 56 Bus Law at 636-37 (cited in note 20). 
For critiques of the Elliott ruling, see, for example, id at 635; William W. Bratton, Pan' PasSil and a 
Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 Emory L J 823 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. 
Pam, The Pal7 Pam! Clause ill Sovereign Debt Instrulllents, 53 Emory L J 869 (2004). 
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\X'hat the Brussels Opinion does is to put a large hammer in the hands of 
holdout creditors, thereby enabling them to cause even more disruption in 
restructurings. Those inclined to be holdouts have a stronger position, and 
it encourages others to hold out. For the sovereigns and, we argue, for the 
majority of creditors, this is a nightmarish situation.24 
The restraining order does indeed amount to a" big stick for creditors, 
which plausibly should not be put in the hands of holdout creditors. Interesting 
new possibilities, however, can be imagined if one thinks of this stick as 
potentially applying to the enforcement of debt payments and seniority more 
generally. If creditors' inability to seize as sets and a sovereign'S limited capacity 
to issue collateralized debt interfere with a sovereign'S ability to borrow,. then an 
effective way of relaxing the sovereign's borrowing constraint may be to give 
creditors the means to credibly threaten to shut out a defaulting sovereign from 
international financial markets by preventing it from paying off new creditors. 
The greater enforcement powers made possible by Elliott-type injunctions 
have inspired several commentators to outline the contours of a contractual 
approach to the enforcement of seniority in sovereign debt. One suggestion, put 
forward by both Zettelmeyer and Gelpern, is for senior creditors to enforce the 
priority ostensibly granted to them by a sovereign debtor vis-a.-vis other junior 
creditors pursuant to a "third-party beneficiary" theory. Junior creditors would 
agree to subordinate their claims, and courts might enforce the subordination, 
based on the theory that the junior creditors could be construed as beneficiaries 
of the financing from the senior creditor.25 Another suggestion, first offered by 
Wood, is to contractually require the sovereign to include senior creditors as 
parties in subsequent junior debt issues.26 I f  sovereign debtors began to include 
these kinds of subordination arrangements in their debt contracts, one could 
conceive of Elliot-type injunctions that courts might grant to senior creditors 
against a sovereign that later attempted to violate the terms of the earlier 
agreement. I f  a sovereign debtor that had agreed to subordinate any subsequent 
debt failed to do so, a creditor could ask a court to enjoin the new issuance. 
While such remedies might conceivably discipline sovereigns and open the 
way for contractual enforcement o f  an absolute priority rule for sovereign debt, 
one concern is that the cure could be worse than the disease. There exists a real 
potential for nightmarish disruptions to the payment system, and one can also 
imagine a multiplication of costly legal actions among creditors. In addition, this 
strategy would impose a continuous monitoring burden on the senior creditors. 
Because any subordination clause included in a creditor's contract with the 
24 
25 
26 
Gulati and Klee, 56 Bus Law at 638 (cited in note 20). 
Zettelmeyer, The Case jor an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt (cited in note 18); Gelpern, 
53 Emory L] at 1152-53 (cited in note 1 S}. 
Philip R. Wood, The Law oj Subordinated Debt (Street & M� ..... 'Well 1990). 
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borrower could not bind a subsequent third-party borrower who might be 
ignorant about the priority arrangement, the senior creditor would be forced to 
police .the debtor to make sure that the sovereign included a subordination 
provision in each subsequent debt issuance.27 
We do not mean to discourage these contractual innovations,  which may 
be the only realistic way fonvard in the absence of a renewed effort on the part 
of major debtor and creditor nations to introduce a sovereign bankruptcy 
procedure. But it is important to recognize that the contractual approach brings 
important risks which could be largely avoided under an expanded statutory debt 
restructuring mechanism, as we now explain. 
C .  O U R  PRO POSAL 
The SDRM either ignores or does not satisfactorily address three critical 
is sues: (1) the absence of a coherent priority scheme; (2) the need for an interim 
financing strategy that refines and alters the role of the IMF; and (3) the need for 
an independent decisionmaker to oversee the sovereign bankruptcy framework. 
In earlier work, we have explained how an expanded sovereign bankruptcy 
framework might handle each of these issues.28 
\X!ith respect to priority, the sovereign bankruptcy framework should 
include a straight first-in-time priority s cheme, together with voting procedures 
that call for absolute priority treatment-that is, the assurance that higher 
priority creditors will be paid in full, and that any haircut will be aimed first at 
lower priority creditors .  Under our proposal, priority would be based on the 
time that the credit was extended, with the debt of any given year taking priority 
over debt is sued in a subsequent year. Based on this priority, the sovereign 
debtor would divide its creditors into clas ses at the outset of a two tier voting 
process for restructuring the sovereign'S debt. For the purposes of the first vote, 
the debtor would make a proposal as to how much of its overall debt would be 
discharged-that is, how large the overall haircut to creditors would be-and 
submit the proposal to a vote of all creditors . 29 If a majority of all creditors 
28 
29 
If the prioril)' arrangement were somehow deemed to be binding on a subseguent creditor, the 
higher "due diligence" burden would fall on new lenders, who would need to determine what the 
stock of outstanding senior debts was before making a loan. Short of setting up a central register 
of �enior debt tha.t .could .be easilv accessed by new lenders this would often be an impossible task. 
Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory LJ at 763 (cited in note 5). 
At first glance, it may appear that the first step vote would invariably lead to a 49 percent haircut 
under a simple majority voting rule, since a bare majority of creditors would form a coalition to 
cut off the remaining creditors, thus increasing the likelihood of repayment for the winning 
creditors. But the minimum winning coalition intuition only applies if there are numerous, same­
sized classes of creditors. If there were only one large creditor class, for instance, the class would 
presumably agree to whatever haircut optimizes its repayment, based on the sovereign debtor's 
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approved the haircut, the debtor would submit a restructuring plan outlining the 
proposed treatment of each class of creditors for a second, class-by-clas s vote.30 
I f  the requisite majority of each class voted yes, the plan would be implemented 
according to its terms.  In the event that one or more classes rejected the plan, on 
the other hand, the court would reduce the creditors' claims in the amount of 
the agreed upon haircut, starting with the lowest priority creditors and working 
up the priority hierarchy. 
This two-step approach has several crucial virtues. Perhaps most 
importantly, it would clarify creditors ' priorities outside of bankruptcy and 
sharply reduce the risk of debt dilution. Since creditors would know that any 
subsequent bankruptcy would be governed by the first-in-time priority scheme, 
the priorities would apply within and without sovereign bankruptcy. 3 1 For 
sovereigns that actually invoked the procedure, the two-step voting structure 
would provide a mechanism for pushing the parties towards a resolution even if 
bargaining broke down, much as the threats of liquidation or cramdown do in 
ordinary corporate bankruptcies under US Chapter 1 1 .32 
The principal exception to absolute priority in our sovereign bankruptcy 
framework comes with its second key feature, interim financing. As with 
corporate debtors under Chapter 1 1, our framework would provide first priority 
for interim financing in order to counteract the debt overhang problem that 
otherwise might discourage lenders from financing the restructuring process .  
Because of the risk that priority treatment would encourage overborrowing, 
however, we distinguish between two categories of loans.  Loans to finance the 
30 
3 1  
32 
financial condition. In the real world, the capital structure of a sovereign debror will fall 
somewhere between the two extremes of numerous, same-sized classes and a single giant class. 
The first stage vote will also be affected by other factors, such as the sovereign debtor's interest in 
seeking only as much of a haircut as is necessary, in order to preserve credibility and its access to 
sovereign debt markets after the bankruptcy. 
Our proposal does not specify the required voting percentage, as the voting rule could be tailored 
by each sovereign when the bankruptcy framework was adopted. But we speculate that many 
would require a two-thirds supermajority, as under US Chapter 1 1 .  Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L 
J at 797 (cited in note 5). 
Sovereigns could, of course, still try to game the system and dilute earlier debt by issuing debt 
,-vith very short maturities as their finances deteriorated. They would have difficulty finding buyers 
for such debt, however, because investors would know that their interests would be wiped out if 
the sovereign debtor filed for bankruptcy before repaying the new debt. 
Under Bankruptcy Code section 1 112(b), creditors can propose that a case be converted to 
Chapter 7 in order to liquidate the debtor; and section 1 1 29(b) provides a mechanism for 
"cramming" down a reorganization plan despite the objection of one or more classes of credirors. 
1 1  USC §§ 1112(b), 1 1 29 (b) (2000) . Although sovereign debtors cannot be liquidated and the 
absence of a liquidation option makes cramdowrr clifficult to imptemerrr, [he [wo-tiered voting 
regime is designed to achieve a similar effect. 
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sovereign's trade debt would be presumptively permissible,33 whereas s ome form 
of approval, such as from a majority of the sovereign's creditors would be 
required for larger loans. This strategy would effectively cabin the size of interim 
loans .  In addition to minimizing the risk o f  overborrowing, the limited interim 
financing would also reduce the impact on the IMP's budget if the IMF 
continued to serve as interim financer.34 
The final is sue is who should oversee the sovereign bankruptcy framework. 
Unlike earlier proposals, which would vest authority in a panel of experts set up 
by a new or existing international organization, our proposal would permit 
sovereign debtors to flie their case in the bankruptcy or insolvency court of any 
jurisdiction where the sovereign has issued bonds (currently, this is likely to 
mean N ew York, London, Frankfurt, or Tokyo) . Not only would judges be 
better decisionmakers than the experts selected by a bureaucratic process, but 
giving sovereigns a choice would promote jurisdictional competition and, as a 
result, further enhance the decision-making process .  The competition would be 
loosely analogous to the benefits of venue choice for corporate debtors in the 
US. 
D. Ap PRAISIN G ARGENTINA'S DEBT 
RESTRU C TURI N G  CHALLEN GES 
It took only three months after a final futile attempt by the IMF to rescue 
Argentina in September 200 1 followed by a desperate move by the Argentine 
government to restructure its domestic debt, for Argentina to face the inevitable 
and declare a default on its foreign debt. At the same time, Argentina also ended 
its nearly decade long currency board experiment, resulting in a rapid and 
substantial depreciation of the peso, which precipitated a systemic bank run. The 
nation's new government hastily responded with a general freeze on bank 
deposits that lasted for over half a year, with devastating effects on the economy. 
The dislocation of the Argentine economy provoked by the default and its 
aftershocks was so great that GDP contracted by 1 1  percent in 2002-with a 
predictable sharp increase in poverty and unemployment. Understandably, in the 
midst of an economic crisis of such magnitude and the associated political 
turmoil, external debt restructuring was not a priority for the Argentine 
government in 2002. Creditors were also reluctant to initiate negotiations at a 
33 For a description of the contours of trade debt financing, see, for example, IMF, Trade Fillance in 
Financial C,ises: Assessment of Key Issues (Dec 9, 2003), available online at 
<http:/ /\vww.imf.org/ externalinp/pdr/cr/2003/eng/120903.pdf> (visited Feb 7, 2005). 
34 Our earlier article contemplated that the IMF would continue to play this role. See Bolton and 
Skeel, 53 Emory L J 763 (cited in note 5). In Part III of this Article, we propose a new strategy for 
interim financing that entails a restructuring of the IMP's role. 
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time when the economy and Argentina's perceived ability to repay its external 
debt were at their lowest. 
While Argentina was undergoing the worst economic crisis in its history, 
commentators in the SDRM debate sometimes pointed to Argentina as a test 
case, which would vindicate advocates of a contractual approach to sovereign 
debt restructuring and show that it was possible to orchestrate a voluntary debt 
restructuring successfully in a short period of time. Unlike the few prior cases of 
successful debt restructuring such as Pakistan, the Ukraine, and Ecuador, the 
size and complexity of Argentina's external debt restructuring problem­
involving multiple bond issues held by hundreds of thousands of creditors all 
over the world and adding up to nearly ninety billion dollars total face value of 
debt-would truly put the contractual approach to the test. Could a voluntary 
restructuring of such magnitude and involving so many creditors be completed 
successfully in a reasonable amount of time? And could Argentina avoid falling 
prey to holdout creditors and to the uncoordinated legal actions of multiple 
creditor groups? 
Advocates of a contractual approach argued that the risk of private 
litigation and the potentially disruptive consequences of court rulings in the 
wake of Elliott Associates v Peru were highly exaggerated. They predicted that no 
US or English court would grant Elliott-type injunctions to Argentine creditors. 
They also maintained that once negotiations started and an offer was on the 
table, the contracting parties would be able to reach a swift agreement without 
undue delays. The only source of delay, they maintained, was due to the 
Argentine government dragging their feet and refusing to initiate negotiations. 
Furthermore, a statutory mechanism for debt restructuring, as envisioned by the 
IMF, would fare just as poorly in inducing the Argentine government to the 
negotiating table. 
Their predictions have only partially been borne out by events. The risk of 
private litigation did indeed turn out to be less important than many 
commentators had feared. There have been fewer lawsuits than expected and the 
US District Court for the Southern District of New York in particular-where 
several actions against Argentina have been brought-has shown considerable 
restraint and willingness to first give negotiations a chance. The court has also 
ruled in favor of Argentina in limiting creditors' ability to seize Argentine assets 
in the US, such as Argentine military as sets and Argentine payments to its 
embassy.35 The same court had earlier certified a class action suit by a group of 
creditors and granted these creditors the right to attach Argentina's commercial 
assets worldwide. Partly in response to this ruling, Argentina had to take several 
35 Angela Pruitt, US Judge limits Scope oJDiscovery on Argentine Assets, Dow Jones Newswires (May 1 3, 
2004) . 
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precautionary steps to protect its assets-such as transferring funds to its 
embassies through channels outside the banking system, and temporarily 
renationalizing the postal service to preempt the attachment of postal service 
assets abroad. While clearly disruptive, these steps have not, however, impo sed 
substantial costs on Argentina as had been feared. 
Predictions of advocates of a laissez faire approach have proved inaccurate, 
on the other hand, as to the likely ease and speed of the voluntary restructuring 
approach. Argentina's experience in the three and a half years following the 
declaration of default on its external debt has, if anything, underscored the 
difficulties and inefficiencies of  a contractual approach, and provides support for 
the more interventionist policy envisioned by the IMF under the SDRM. Indeed, 
nearly four years have passed and an incomplete restructuring agreement has 
only just now been secured. These nearly four years of delay are not entirely 
attributable to the Argentine government's reluctance to negotiate. A first offer 
in September of 2003 to write off 75 percent of the nominal value of the debt 
had been flatly rejected by creditors as too low, especially in light of the 
promising signs of recovery of the economy in the early months of 2003. After 
the collapse of this first round of negotiations, creditors did not sit still. Many 
small holders of Argentine bonds, mainly based in Europe, organized themselves 
under the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders ("GCAB ")-a 
bondholder committee seeking to represent dispersed bondholders in direct 
negotiations with the Argentine government. 
Although a recent debt- swap offer has been accepted by a roughly 75 
percent majority of creditors, there have never been formal direct negotiations 
between the GCAB or any other representative bondholder committee in the 
past two years.36 Indeed, with the strong backing of Argentine public opinion 
and a strengthening economy, the Kirchner government adopted a hard 
negotiating line and refused to make significant concessions on its first offer. 
Although Argentina's ability to repay its debts has significantly improved over 
the past two years, its willingness to pay has if anything decreased. Most of  
Argentina's costs of default had been incurred in 2002 and were sunk by the 
time negotiations started. Neither the Argentine economy nor the government 
was in urgent need of borrowing from international capital markets . With the 
GCAB insisting that Argentina's ability to repay should be the only criterion for 
determining the size of  a reasonable haircut, there was little room for a mutual 
understanding between the two parties. 
Despite the tough stance taken by the Argentine government and its 
decision to move forward with a new unilateral, take-it-or-leave-it, debt swap 
offer, it still took considerable time to put forward a new proposal. There were 
36 Adam Thomson, A"gentina Seeks to Ease Creditor Concerns on Debt Clause, Fin Times 6 Oan 1 5 , 2005). 
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initial hesitations as to the form of the offer and the extent to which early 
adopters should be favored over later adopters to build in an incentive to accept 
the exchange.37 The Argentine government had further difficulty in enlisting an 
investment bank to organize the debt exchange. And finally, following a 
worldwide road-show to advertise the exchange�. Argentina still had to receive 
the approval of a number of National Financial Regulators in countries like Italy, 
where a large number of small Argentine bondholders resided. 
The successful completion of the recent swap is not due to Argentina 
coming around to bondholders' demands. Rather, after sticking to its tough 
bargaining stance for nearly four years, Argentina has managed to wear down a 
large fraction of creditors . Also, Argentina has benefited from a sharp decline in 
emerging market debt yields-an unexpected development that has produced a 
substantial increase in the real value of the debt exchange. 
At the time of writing it is not possible to say what will happen to the 
holdouts of the recent debt exchange. Will their bargaining position be 
strengthened or weakened? Will they prevail in court against attempts by the 
Argentine government to stay in default on those bonds? Thus, even after 
Argentina's resounding victory in the latest debt exchange, it is still not clear 
how successfully the voluntary debt restructuring process will play out with the 
significant fraction of holdouts . Few observers would describe this experience as 
vindication of a laissez faire approach. It is even harder to describe Argentina's 
debt restructuring experience as particularly favorable to creditors. Bondholders 
could hardly have obtained worse terms had the restructuring taken place under 
a more formal bankruptcy procedure such as that proposed by the SDRM. In all 
likelihood they would have secured a deal much sooner and under better terms .  
In hindsight, the Argentine experience points to one major advantage o f  a 
statutory approach: it can be structured to keep the negotiating process moving 
forward by specifying hard deadlines for offers to be submitted, as in Chapter 
1 1 ,  and by structuring incentives for the parties to come to a quick resolution of 
the restructuring process.  The Argentine experience also highlights that creditors 
can be put in a weaker bargaining position under laissez faire through a coercive 
exchange offer than they would be under a statutory procedure where final 
approval depends on some form of supermajority voting. 
37 According to Dow Jones, the Argentine government eventually decided to abandon initial plans 
to include "exit consent" clauses in Argentina's debt-swap offer as a way of avoiding potential 
future litigation and securing approval of the plan with some countries' financial regulators. 
Argentina LaIJagna: Confirms No Debt Swap "Exit Consents ", Dow Jones Newswires (Nov 5, 2004) . 
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I I I .  T RANSFO R MING THE I M P ' s  ROLE AS A LEND ER 
OF LAST RESORT 
The IMP's place in the international financial architecture is now more 
uncertain than it has been since the collapse of the Bretton Woods framework in 
the 1 970s. The size of the Fund relative to international financial flows and to 
the stock of foreign reserves held by central banks around the world has been 
shrinking to the point where it can no longer play a credible leadership role as 
lender of last resort for any but the smaller emerging market borrowers. As a 
result, the Fund has increasingly been drawn to focus on emerging market 
countries and to redefine its mission as one of macroassistance to developing 
nations and to poverty reduction-a role traditionally performed by the World 
Bank. It is not clear whether the Fund has the expertise to fill this new role 
effectively, and there is a risk that it may end up being marginalized by the 
World Bank and other development aid agencies. But more importantly, the new 
mission that has been pressed onto the IMF due to lack of funding is not the 
mission that the Fund has been set up to pursue. 
One obvious way of restoring the IMP's original role, advocated by some 
G-7 countries ,  is to substantially increase the size of the Fund. But even if this 
enlargement were feasible, the history of past interventions would still raise 
major concerns about the potential distortions large bailout packages can 
introduce into sovereign debt markets. Another way forward, advocated by 
several leading economists, is to move in the opposite direction-further scaling 
back. the size of the fund, phasing out IMF programs entirely, and confining the 
IMF to a purely advisory role.38 
We believe that neither of these two options is desirable. If the IMF were 
no longer a major source of emergency lending for distressed sovereigns, as 
advocates of a scaled back IMF propose, why should sovereign governments pay 
any attention to its advice? Even free advice would not be welcome, and the 
IMF would be doomed to irrelevance. More importantly, once the IMF exited 
the lending business ,  it could no longer play its role as catalyst to help resolve 
liquidity crises and debt panics.39 The alternative solution, a much larger but 
unreformed and highly political institution, would give rise to moral hazard in 
lending and other distortions. Perpetuating the status quo is equally undesirable, 
since it would be equivalent to condemning the institution to a slow death. 
3H 
39 
See Rogoff, Tbe Sisters at 60, Economist at 65 (cited in note 2); Chari and Kehoe, Asking tbe Rigbt 
Qllestions about tbe IlvIF, Federal Reserve Bank of J\,iinneapolis Annual Report Issue (cited in note 
2) . 
See Giancarlo Corsetti, Bernardo Guimaraes, and Nouriel Roubini, Intemational Lending of Last 
Res0l1 and Moral Hazard: A Mode! ofIMF's Catalytic Finance, NBER Working Paper No 1 0 1 25 (Dec 
2003), available online at <http: //papers.nber.org/papers/w10125 .pdf> (visited Mar 20, 2005). 
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Rather than any of these alternatives, we believe that the IMP's role should 
be reconfigured in a very different way, as part of a sovereign bankruptcy 
framework that establishes an enforceable priority system for sovereign debt. 
The role we envision would strengthen the IMF's ability to act as an ILOLR in 
emerging market liquidity and. confidence, crises; It would also strengthen the 
IMP's hand in resolving sovereign debt insolvency crises.  Yet it would not 
require any new public funding. 
The proposal is quite simple. Instead of acting like a central bank that 
provides liquidity to a bank facing a bank run, the IMF would function like a 
bankruptcy court charged with granting first-day orders and other DIP 
financing. In practice, not much change would be required in the way the IMF 
operates. A distressed sovereign would still begin by approaching the Fund with 
a request for an assistance package. The size of the loan and its conditionality 
would still be negotiated between the Fund and the sovereign behind closed 
doors. The loan agreement would still have to be approved by the IMF's Board. 
But under the new role we envision, the IMF would put together a funding 
package that would include priority lending from the private sector along with its 
own funds and any other public funding it can assemble. Over time, the IMF 
would need to rely on a greater and greater contribution from the private sector. 
To secure this sovereign debt version of DIP financing, the negotiations 
inevitably would involve the private sector as well as the IMF, since few private 
lenders are anxious to lend on a sight-unseen basis.  In practice, the private sector 
involvement would be an important benefit of the new model we envision. 
Currently, when a package is put together the private sector does not participate 
in the negotiations and essentially must take the deal the IMF has worked out 
with the sovereign as a fait accompli. This process not only makes it more difficult 
to involve the private sector, but also encourages free riding by private lenders 
on the IMP's emergency lending. Under our proposed new system, private 
lenders would be directly involved in the negotiations; private sector 
involvement would thus automatically be tied to the rescue deal. The 
coordination between private lenders and the IMP's role as ILOLR is an 
important benefit of our framework. 
Another important benefit of the new model is that it would gradually shift 
from taxpayer to private sector money and would be subject to more and more 
market discipline. If the private sector viewed a proposed rescue package as just 
more money down the drain, it would in all likelihood refuse to extend new 
lending even if the new loans had higher priority status. 40 Similarly, if the 
40 This intuition is buttressed by the experience in Chapter 11  cases. The existing empirical evidence 
suggests that DIP financers are more likely to lend to debtors that have a significant chance of 
successfully reorganizing, than to more precarious firms. See, for example, Maria Carapeto, Does 
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sovereign were a repeat offender it would, over time, have less and less access to 
emergency lending and would risk being shut out of the international credit 
markets.41 The reason is simply that following each crisis the sovereign would 
have accumulated a larger stock of still outstanding priority debt and would be 
less and less able to secure new DIP financing, particularly if, as we propose 
below, prior DIP loans have priority over any subsequent DIP financing.42 
While the new role we envision calls for a radical departure from existing 
policy, it would not fundamentally change the process by which the larger crises 
are ' currently handled. Consider, for example, how the IMF managed South 
Korea's debt crisis in 1 997. After a substantial rescue package was put together 
on December 3, 1 997, it quickly became clear that the funds promised to the 
South Korean government would be insufficient. 43 The package had not 
adequately reassured markets, and banks continued to pull out of Korean 
sovereign debt, refusing to roll over their short-term loans, something they had 
never objected to doing in the past. Faced with an impending crisis, the Treasury 
and Federal Reserve resolved as a last resort to convene a meeting with the 
major lenders under the auspices of the New York Fed on December 22, 1 997, 
and managed to wring an informal agreement from those present to continue 
rolling over their loans.44 The only way the Treasury and Fed could entice the 
banks to attend the meeting, and then to cooperate by agreeing to roll over their 
loans, was mora! suasion bolstered by the fear of a major financial crisis if banks 
refused to follow the IMP's lead. As several commentators have observed, moral 
suasion is a rather weak inducement to rely on in dealing with a crisis of these 
proportions . It would be foolish to depend on such a policy to maintain 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Debtor-in·Possession Financing Add Va/tie? (unpublished manuscript, 2003), available online at 
<http:/ h.vww.cass.city.ac.uk/ faculty/mcarapeto/papers/DIPFinancing.pdf> (visited Mar 20, 
2005) (finding that debtors receiving interim financing more likely to reorganize); Sandeep Dahiya 
et aI, Debtor·in-Possession Financing and Bankl7lptcy Resolution: Empin'cal Evidence, 69 J Fin Econ 259 
(2003) (same) . 
Our approach would not preclude debt reduction initiatives for Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
("HIPCs"). These initiatives '-vould merely take a different form. Instead of forgiving previously 
granted official multilateral debt, the international community would buy private debt in the 
secondary market and then retire it. 
See text accompanying note 49. 
A total of fifty.five billion dollars, of which twenty·one billion dollars was contributed by the 
IMF, was promised the South Korean government. This represented the highest amount the IMF 
had ever lent to a single country and exceeded the normal quota by a multiple of six. See Blustein, 
The Chastening at 1 48 (cited in note 1 ) .  
Six US banks-Citibank, J .P .  Morgan, Chase, Bank of America, Bankers Trust, and Bank of  New 
York-attended the first New York meeting, which kick·started a series of negotiations with 
international banks that eventually led to a rescheduling agreement of twenty·two billion dollars in 
short-term loans in exchange for a sovereign bond, with the Korean government on January 28, 
1 998. Id at 1 77-205. 
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international financial stability. It is not difficult to imagine a different outcome 
to the Korean crisis, with some major banks deciding not to attend the meeting 
at the New York Fed for example, and others unwilling to go along with the 
IMF or unable to agree on how the cost of rolling over their debts should be 
shared. 
Now imagine the same situation, but with the IMF wielding new powers to 
grant priority status to banks' new emergency lending. In contrast to the 
situation at the time, under this new regime banks would have had an incentive 
to attend the meeting, since this might have given them an opportunity to obtain 
higher priority status for their new loans. The higher priority would have put 
them in a stronger position than the banks that did not attend the meeting if the 
rescue plan failed and Korea defaulted on its existing debts. In addition, for 
those banks attending the meeting, the IMF would have been able to secure 
their cooperation much more easily by granting seniority status to their new 
loans.45 
While the potentially huge benefits of this new role for the IMP are 
obvious, there also are several potential concerns. A first issue is whether a 
highly politicized institution like today's IMF would abuse its new powers and 
grant priority lending too liberally. This was a constant worry in the early days of 
Chapter 1 1 , with courts permitting debtors to drag out cases for years, and 
generally deviating too easily from enforcement of absolute priority. 46 The 
history of IMF bailouts suggests that similar problems could undermine the 
framework we have described unless the ability to grant priority status to 
emergency lending was constrained. One such constraint might be to require 
creditor approval of DIP loans, if the loans are beyond a certain size or involve a 
high proportion of new lenders.47 
There is a delicate balancing here, however, as any approval required by 
creditors before the DIP financing is granted could undermine the IMP's ability 
to respond quickly and quietly to a crisis .  Announcing to all creditors that a 
sovereign is seeking their approval for new DIP financing is tantamount to 
45 
46 
47 
Although the size of the bank loans would often be quite large, there is no reason to suspect that 
this would jeopardize the financing process we propose. In ordinary corporate bankruptcy cases, 
bankruptcy courts have overseen major loans-such as the $.1.5 billion DIP loan to United 
Airlines-without a hitch. 
See for example Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 1 1, 1993 Wise L Rev 729 
(documenting the increased length of Chapter 1 1  cases). 
The possibility of a creditor vote on financing in the corporate context is considered and critiqued 
in George G. Triantis, A Theory if the Regulation if Debtor-in-Possessiol1 Financing, 46 Vand L Rev 901, 
915-16 (1 993). Our previous article proposed that financing in amounts sufficient to cover a 
sovereign's trade debt should presumptively be approved, without a creditor vote. Bolton and 
Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 808 (cited in note 5). 
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broadcasting the sovereign's financial distress to the world and may well do 
more harm than good. Therefore, unless the sovereign was already in default and 
had suspended debt payments, and short of reforming the governance of the 
IMF, a more practical protection would be to either put ex ante limits on the 
size of DIP financing (such as a maximum percentage of outstanding debt) or to 
allow for the possibility that courts could reverse the priority status of the most 
egregious forms of DIP financing ex post if the sovereign subsequently invoked 
the bankruptcy procedures once again. This latter possibility would instill some 
market discipline on the DIP lenders and limit the worst forms of abuse of DIP 
financing-although at the cost of introducing additional uncertainty into the 
lending markets.48 
A second concern is whether a priority rule for sovereign debt could be 
enforced at all. How would the IMF be able to enforce priority? How should a 
recalcitrant sovereign be dealt with? So far the IMF has on the whole been able 
to enforce the higher priority of -its own funds . 49 The IMP's success can be 
traced to a maj or carrot and stick it can apply to enforce its priority status.  
Compliant sovereigns continue to have access to IMF programs at favorable 
rates, whereas a recalcitrant sovereign risks losing its membership and facing 
some form of exclusion from sovereign debt markets. There is no reason a 
priori to expect that the IMP's enforcement powers would disappear if the loan 
were made by the private sector with the IMF's blessing. But, should the stock 
of senior debt become so large that the sovereign might be tempted to default 
and to ignore the priority status in a restructuring, one could still enVlSlon 
enforcement of priority through the courts via Elliott-style remedies.  
Third, what happens when a sovereign repeatedly runs into financial 
distress and accumulates senior loans from past DIP financing? Wouldn't new 
DIP financing risk diluting old DIP loans, if the sovereign debtor defaulted a 
second or even third time on all its debt? And if this dilution were anticipated 
wouldn't it prevent the IMF from obtaining emergency lending from the private 
sector? An obvious way of addres sing these problems would be to make sure 
that past DIP loans had priority over current and future DIP loans. In effect, the 
first priority DIP loans would themselves be subject to a first-in-time priority 
regtme. 
Fourth, how would Paris Club and other bilateral government debt be 
treated? Ideally, Paris Club creditors would be subj ect to the same restructuring 
process as other creditors . It is unlikely, however, that sovereign lenders would 
48 
49 
Under US bankruptcy law, a court's initial decision on DIP financing generally cannot be reversed 
so long as the credit was extended in good faith-a protection that is justified as necessary to 
ensure certainty. See 1 1  USC § 364(e). 
See Zettelmeyer, The Case for all Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt (cited in note 1 8) .  
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agree to put themselves under the authority of the IMF or a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime.  The most plausible approach for handling Paris Club debt 
would be to treat it as a priority obligation. Although this poses the risk that 
Paris Club loans will dilute the interests of private creditors, one benefit is the 
pos sibility that an alternative source of emergency lending to sovereigns would 
be available that could serve the role of a safety valve in cases where the IMF 
failed to intervene, perhaps for political reasons . 
The final issue is implementation: What changes would need to be made to 
restructure the IMP's role as we have described? Advocates of sovereign 
bankruptcy have proposed a variety of implementation strategies. One 
commentator suggests that sovereigns could unilaterally adopt a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime. 50 Under this approach, a model law could be drafted by 
UNCITRAL or another international organization, and the legislatures of 
sovereign debtor states could pass legislation based on the draft law. In effect, 
the bankruptcy framework would set the parameters of the debtor's obligations 
to its creditors. A second strategy would rely on treaties among the creditor and 
debtor nations or a convention ratified by the legislatures of the various affected 
countries. Still another strategy centers on an amendment of the IMP's articles, 
which would require majority approval by the IMF and approval of three-fifths 
of the Fund's members .51 Members would then be expected to take appropriate 
steps to implement the change under their domestic law. This third approach is 
the strategy the IMF planned to use to implement its SDRM.52 
We believe that the new role we envision for the IMF would not by itself 
require arry of these changes .  Since our proposal would simply reconfigure the 
IMF's existing role-retaining IMF oversight while privatizing the lending 
function-it should not require the IMF to go back to its members to ask for 
different or additional authority. This suggests that the IMF could adopt the 
reconfigured role on an ad hoc basis, by negotiating a flllancing package that 
relies on private lending the next time it intervenes in a sovereign debt crisis. In 
our view, the ease with which the proposal could be adopted is one of its signal 
attractions. 
so 
51 
52 
Christoph G. Paulus, A Legal Order for Insolvencies of States 6-7 (unpublished manuscript), available 
online at <http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/sdrm/paulus.htm> (visited Mar 20, 2005). 
More precisely, amendment of the IMF Articles requires three steps: (1) the Executive Board 
votes on a proposed amendment, and it is approved by a majority of rhose who vote; (2) the 
amendment is approved by a majority of rhe Board of Governors who vote; and (3) it is approved 
by three-fifths of the members of the Fund, with at least 85 percent of the total voting authority. 
See for example IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructun'ng Mechanism-Further Considerations 
at '\) 275-82 (cited in note 1 1) (describing the amendment proces-s} 
Id. 
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Adjusting the IMF's role by itself, however, is an incomplete solution to 
the shortcomings in the existing international financial architecture; most 
importantly, it would not address the need for a coherent, enforceable priority 
scheme-a need that we have stressed throughout the Article. But even in the 
absence of a more complete reform such as sovereign bankruptcy, the 
reconfigured IMF role offers two hugely important benefits: it would address 
the IMF's funding limitations and would bring the private sector into the heart 
of the debt restructuring process. More generally, the reconfigured role would 
preserve the IMF's relevance for the sovereign debt markets of the new century. 
These benefits suggest that it would make sense to adopt the new approach 
now, without waiting for more sweeping reforms such as implementation of a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime. 
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